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ABSTRACT 
 
The EU-enlargement in mid-2004 will probably be followed by the accession to the 
European Monetary and Economic Union (EMU), depending on the individual state of 
convergence of the accession candidates. In this paper, we argue that institutional 
convergence, in particular central bank independence (CBI), is equally – if not more – 
important for a successful common monetary policy in an enlarged Euroland than 
nominal and real convergence, as it indicates an appropriate policy assignment and 
thereby fosters real and nominal convergence. The paper starts with an assessment of 
the state of convergence of CEE countries in nominal and real terms. Based on a 
constitutional political economy framework and the additional requirement for future 
EMU members to give their central banks an independent status, we then assess the 
degree of central bank independence in CEE. We apply a measure, namely the index of 
monetary commitment, which includes external criteria such as convertibility and 
exchange rate regimes. It can be shown that the degree of central bank independence in 
CEE countries is considerably high; however, there is a gap to the ECB’s independence 
with respect to external aspects of CBI.  
 
 
                                                          
1   This paper was initiated following a discussion on central banks’ independence at the ACE Phare 
research project „Alternative exchange rate regimes in transition economies“ second workshop in 
Strunjan, 15-16 June 2001, organized by the Institute for Economic Research (IER), Ljubljana. 
2  University of Cologne, Robert-Koch-Str. 4, D-50931 Cologne, Germany, Tel.: ++49 221 470 4879, 
Fax: ++49 221 470 5187, e-mail: andreas.freytag@uni-koeln.de. This paper is part of a research 
project entitled “Economic Order and CBI in the Enlarged EMU“, the author is conducting for the 
Otto-Wolff-Institute for Economic Policy. In addition, the author gratefully acknowledges very 
helpful comments by Sandra Dvorsky, Ferdinand Fichtner, Marianne Keudel and Philipp Paulus. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The EU-enlargement in mid-2004 is an official marking of the end of the transition 
period to a market economy for a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Others are still to follow. Regardless of their current status as 
accession candidate, almost all CEE countries are preparing themselves to finally 
become a member of the European Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). Despite 
these efforts, there still are significant differences with respect to convergence towards 
the EU average. Convergence can be defined in different ways. The Maastricht criteria 
demand nominal convergence of public debt, public deficit, inflation, interest rates and 
a constant exchange rate between the accession candidate’s currency and the euro. In 
contrast to this requirement, many observers claim that real convergence, e.g. the 
development of productivity, is the issue that truly matters. This issue has gained 
relevance in early 2003 as politicians in both current member countries and accession 
countries have expressed their desire for more flexible arrangements – in other words 
for less strict commitment.3 
In this paper, we argue that institutional convergence is equally – if not more – 
important than other forms of convergence for a successful common monetary policy in 
Euroland, as the proper institutional arrangement is a precondition for stability and 
growth, i.e. nominal and real convergence. The state of institutional convergence 
reveals the individual accession country’s attitude towards commitment and the 
appropriate policy assignment. Institutional convergence in this context implies the 
adoption of the EU’s formal (and informal) rules including the “acquis communautaire” 
by the accession countries, in particular central bank independence (CBI). The Treaty of 
Maastricht requires the introduction of CBI for potential EMU members. Nevertheless, 
differences in detail between countries, which may lead to potential and significant 
conflicts in the future, are likely. These differences can be overlooked, if the definition 
and measure of CBI applied neglects some aspects of monetary commitment.  
                                                          
3 The discussion is also taking place among academics. It is mainly directed at reforming the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). For critique at the SGP and reform proposals see e.g. 
Eichengreen (2003) and Eijffinger (2003).  
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The paper starts with an assessment of the state of convergence of CEE countries in 
nominal and real terms (section II). In the third section, we set the theoretical 
framework for the introduction of CBI and introduce some measures of CBI. We then 
assess the degree of central bank independence in CEE by referring to the literature and 
to own calculations. We apply a measure of monetary commitment, which includes both 
internal and external criteria such as convertibility and exchange rate regimes. It turns 
out that the degree of central bank independence in CEE countries is considerably high; 
however, there is a gap to the ECB’s independence with respect to external aspects of 
CBI in some countries and concerning the strictness of limitations to government 
borrowing from the central bank in others. This gap will be analysed against the 
background of the theoretical framework. The paper ends with policy conclusions for a 
future enlarged EMU.  
 
II. Different Aspects of Convergence 
 
The debate on convergence of the CEE countries to the EMU member countries has 
shifted recently from nominal convergence to real convergence and the potential policy 
dilemma when striving for both. As for nominal convergence, for entrants to the EMU 
the Maastricht Treaty requires to stay below well-defined thresholds for public debt, 
annual public budget deficits, interest rates and inflation as well as the stability of the 
nominal exchange rate for a minimum of two years prior to EMU accession.4 On the 
basis of these criteria the European Council decides whether or not a country is mature 
enough to join EMU. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) requires the 
member countries to meet the fiscal criteria also during membership.5 Currently, only a 
few transition countries in CEE struggle with the fiscal criteria (see Table 1). 
Consequently, in the literature about enlargement, the SGP currently does not play a 
significant role.  
                                                          
4 The thresholds are: 60 per cent of GDP stock of public debt, 3 per cent of GDP annual public 
deficit, inflation rate 1.5 per cent above the average of the best three performing countries and 
interest rates 2 per cent above the average of the best three performing countries.  
5 In case of an excessive deficit, the European Council is enabled to demand appropriate steps to 
reduce this deficit. If these steps are not taken, a deposit of 0.2–0.5 per cent of GDP may be 
charged, which can be converted into a fine (EEAG 2003, p. 53f). 
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Rather, the likely effects of fast real convergence on the real exchange rate and 
consequently on the inflation rates have been discussed widely. Szapáry (2000) argues 
that countries may feel tempted to repress economic growth for one year or even longer 
prior to accession in order to meet the inflation criterion (weighing-in syndrome). After 
the very country has become a member, inflation will be spurred via extensive 
productivity growth beyond the established member countries. Szapáry – and others6 – 
therefore suggests to skip that criterion. Empirical evidence of this effect, the so-called 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, is somewhat mixed. Only about 0-2 percentage points of the 
average inflation differential between accession candidates can be explained by the 
effect (Mihaljek 2002).7 Other explanations for the high inflation differential include 
changes of administrative prices (MacDonald and Wojcik 2002) as well as investment 
demand (Fischer 2002), not to mention different monetary policy. The latter has been a 
decreasing problem for transition economies in the second half of the 1990s.  
However, this mixed evidence does not imply that future problems with the inflation 
criterion are not to be expected. Besides the causes mentioned above, there are also 
other potential causes for higher inflation in accession countries than in established 
member countries, particularly after EU accession. One cause can be the high inflow of 
structural funds into the new member countries from 2004 on. These can add 
purchasing power in the country of up to 4 per cent of GDP, potentially leading to an 
increase in the prices for non-tradables. Similarly, a potential increase in capital inflows 
after EU accession due to improved investment opportunity will also cause purchasing 
power in the very country to rise. Spain has made his experience in the late 1980s after 
the southern enlargement. A surge in capital inflows increased the inflation rate in the 
European Monetary System (EMS) (Dluhosch, Freytag and Krüger 1996, pp. 199-204). 
In both cases, the responsibility for the real appreciation (via the price increase of non-
tradables) and the subsequent increase in inflation is not with the accession countries. It 
is not necessary that macroeconomic policy is unsound to produce these results.  
Table 1 gives evidence about the state of nominal (columns 1 through 3) and real 
(columns 4 through 7) convergence of CEE accession candidates. It reveals that some 
                                                          
6 E.g. Buiter and Grafe (2002, p. 23) argue that “To make inflation a convergence criterion for 
monetary union is putting the cart in front of the horse“.  
7 See Égert (2002) for a differentiated analysis of major accession countries.  
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countries still have a substantially higher inflation rate than Euroland (2.2 per cent on 
average in 2002). Only the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland would pass 
this criterion. In contrast, fiscal policy can be regarded as being considerably solid in 
most countries, except for the four bigger ones, where the annual deficit has increased in 
2002. It has been expected that in Hungary and the Czech Republic the situation will 
not improve during 2003. Finally, the debt stock is not a problem so far for any of the 
CEE countries under scrutiny. To the contrary, some countries, in particular Estonia and 
its Baltic neighbours, show a remarkable fiscal discipline.8 It is fair to say that the 
accession candidates have made good progress with respect to inflation and fiscal 
policy. Their fiscal position seems to be even better than the position of the EMU-12 
countries in 1997 when the decision about the EMU’s founding members were taken.  
Table 1: Nominal and real convergence in accession countries in 2002 
 HICP, 
annual 
change 
in per 
cent 
Annual 
public 
budget 
balance in 
per cent of 
GDP 
Stock of 
public 
debt in 
per cent 
of GDP 
GDP 
per 
capita, 
EU = 
1001 
Labour 
market 
produc-
tivity, Ger-
many = 
1002 
Unem
-ploy-
ment 
(per 
cent) 
Current 
account 
deficit in 
per cent 
of GDP 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Bulgaria 6.5 -0.8 58.1 28.1 (=) n.a. 18.0 5.7 
Czech 
Republic 
2.5 -5.9 25.6 57.2 (-) 23 7.8 3.8 
Estonia 4.8 -0.4 4.4 42.2 (+) 16 13.0 6.9 
Hungary 5.5 -5.8 52.9 51.0 (+) 24 6.2 4.0 
Latvia 2.7 -1.8 16.8 33.3 (+) 14 12.5 8.5 
Lithuania 1.2 -1.8 23.6 37.6 (+) 14 15.7 5.9 
Poland 2.1 -6.2 43.3 39.7 (=) 20 18.8 3.6 
Romania 25.0 -3.0 24.6 25.3 (+) 9 7.8 5.1 
Slovakia 4.2 -3.6 39.6 47.7 (-) 43 18.6 8.0 
Slovenia 7.5 -1.3 27.9 68.8 (=) 18 6.0 0.5 
1: in 2001; 2: in 2000 (Égert 2003, p. 3); =, +, -: change in comparison with 1999;  
other sources: SVR (2002, p. 72), EEAG (2003, p. 64). 
 
Whereas policymakers in the European Union leave no doubt that the Maastricht criteria 
are exclusively relevant for the assessment of CEE countries’ maturity and ability to 
                                                          
8 In Estonia, the government is by law prohibited to run a permanent public deficit (Ennuste 2001, p. 
352).  
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join the EMU,9 policymakers in the accession countries and economists have started to 
discuss the issue and to refer to real convergence. Columns 4 through 7 in Table 1 show 
the degree of real convergence. The real GDP per capita varies from 25 per cent of 
EMU average in Romania to almost 70 per cent in Slovenia. It is noticeable that the 
bigger transition countries, which were catching up faster in the past, now have more 
difficulties to close the gap. Labour productivity is lower than GDP per capita when 
compared with EU average (although German labour productivity is above EMU 
average). Both indicators show that productivity gains relative to EMU average so far 
have not been extraordinarily high, which is in line with empirical evidence concerning 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The high rate of unemployment, however, is an indicator 
for the opposite, as an increase in unemployment ceteris paribus implies also an increase 
in productivity. The firms certainly try to lay off the least productive employees. In 
addition, there is obviously much potential for future productivity gains plus real 
appreciation. This can also be seen when analysing the current account balances in the 
accession countries. The current account deficits imply a considerable capital inflow in 
2002, which has been preceded by about equally high net capital inflows in the years 
before. If these capital flows will continue in 2004 and the years to follow, there will 
also be an upward pressure on the real exchange rate. If the EU enlargement results in 
the expected positive consequences for the new members, this scenario will be highly 
likely. The data support the theoretical considerations about the probability that 
accession candidates miss the nominal convergence criteria.  
However, it cannot be desirable to repress economic activity and to accept a recession 
for a year or more in order to meet the criteria, as feared by Szapáry (2000). So there 
obviously is a trade-off between the objective to accelerate growth and the objective to 
meet the Maastricht criteria, in particular the inflation criterion. As this discrepancy is 
so clear, one cannot be sure that the European Council will not take it into account when 
deciding about the enlargement in 2006 or later. The acknowledgement of this trade-off 
and the accession countries’ efforts to foster both real and nominal convergence may 
well lead to the decision that countries join the monetary union regardless of the missed 
                                                          
9 Maier and Hendrikx (2003) argue in addition that social convergence is important to avoid future 
conflicts about appropriate monetary policy in an enlarged EMU.  
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inflation criterion.10 This political rather than economic decision making process could 
be observed in 1998 when 11 countries joined the European Union, although formally 
only three (Finland, France and Luxembourg) met all criteria. As the evidence also 
shows, the fact that the majority did not meet the criteria completely does not inevitably 
imply unsound monetary policy for the future. In addition, it is fair to assume that in a 
situation as described the well-known argument will be employed that the criteria are 
not justified economically but rather arbitrarily chosen.  
Therefore, another safeguard mechanism is necessary to protect the EMU from 
countries with sustained unsound macroeconomic policy joining the monetary union, 
namely institutional convergence. The literature on rules vs. discretion has made the 
case for a strong monetary commitment to avoid surprise inflation. Indeed, it seems to 
be more important to create an institutional setting, which prevents an inflationary bias 
and sets the highest possible standards in monetary policy than to at any rate avoid an 
increase in inflation due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. A high degree of monetary 
commitment can help with both price stability and economic growth; in other words: 
nominal and real convergence in Central and Eastern Europe positively depend on 
institutional convergence.  
 
III. CBI as Constitutional Rule: Theoretical Considerations 
 
Monetary policy in Euroland is rule bound. The European Central Bank (ECB) has to 
follow a clearly defined policy objective, namely price stability. It also is required to 
follow other objectives, if this does not endanger price stability. However, the Bank 
interprets this according to a neo-classical economic policy assignment: the best way to 
meet economic policy objectives is to provide stable money (de Grauwe 2002, p. 694).11  
                                                          
10 This seems to be particularly probable, if small countries such as e.g. the Baltic countries meet all 
criteria and bigger ones such as Hungary or Poland do not.  
11 De Grauwe (2002, pp. 694-702) criticises the ECB for this interpretation. Thereby, he implicitly 
assumes that economic policy is pursued by benevolent policymakers. This view does not stand a 
political economy perspective.  
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The European Central Bank is according to its statute (IWP 2003) legally very 
independent from politics and has proven its ability to resist pressures from politics very 
well. In particular, the opportunities of national governments to exert pressure on the 
ECB are rather low. In order to qualify for EU membership (in particular EMU 
membership), the CEE accession countries also have to introduce CBI as part of the 
“acquis communautaire”. This requirement is theoretically justified by the political 
nature of inflation processes. There is a theoretical case and solid empirical evidence 
that inflation, in particular high and hyperinflation is caused by the inability (or 
unwillingness) of governments to meet other policy objectives such as employment or 
fiscal needs with other means than the money press.12 There is also evidence that 
inflation occurs mainly in the absence of adequate monetary policy rules, in other words 
monetary commitment is negatively correlated with inflation, although surprisingly low 
(Berger et al. 2001, Freytag 2002b).  
 
The economic reason for a strict legal monetary commitment is that ex-ante the citizens 
prefer price stability over inflation; they know that the distributional effects of inflation 
are very uncertain and arbitrary. In general, the government is willing to follow this 
objective as well. However, in certain circumstances, the government’s preferences 
switch, and it would like to deviate from the objective of price stability in order to meet 
other policy objectives with the help of monetary policy.13 In such a situation, a 
majority even might be in favour of a lax monetary policy, deviating from the objective 
of price stability although there can be no serious doubt that neither price stability nor 
the other goal is sustainably met with this deviation. Thus, it makes sense for the society 
to protect itself from the government’s discretion and from own insecurities. This is 
done in a “constitutional decision”.14 The society opts for a rule based monetary policy, 
aiming at price stability as the only or primary goal (see discussion above). To raise the 
political costs of discretionary policy, commitment has to be strong. Monetary 
                                                          
12 See e.g. Cukierman (1992, chapters 3 through 5), Fischer et al. (2002) and Freytag (2002a).  
13 Technically speaking, the number of arguments in the government’s utility function is higher than 
the number of effective policy instruments to satisfy the utility function.  
14 A “constitutional decision“ is not restricted to the country’s constitution; it rather reflects the idea 
that it is a decision about the rules of the game. These can be laid down in a law, a statute or (as in 
the case of EMU) in an international treaty. Following Hetzel (1997, pp. 50f), the monetary rule 
should have constitutional quality, albeit spelled with a small ‘c’ rather than a capital ‘C’. 
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commitment is commitment of governments (Brennan and Buchanan 1981). It is the 
government that promises to stick to stability oriented monetary regime.15 The regime 
defines rules and responsibilities with a focus on price stability. There are several ways 
to define the regime, of which we discuss contracts for central bankers and central bank 
independence.  
To begin with, government can conclude a contract with the members of the central 
bank’s board, which foresees a punishment once a certain inflation rate is missed 
(Walsh 1995). However, it has to be noted that the underlying principal-agent-problem 
is not described appropriately by this setting, as it assumes the government being the 
principal and the central bankers being the agents. Surely, this problem exists. 
Nevertheless, this model does not consider the governmental self-interest appropriately 
by assuming that the government is only representing the citizens. It seems more 
adequate to assume the public being the principal and the government being the agent, 
trying to benefit from hidden information.16 Contracts for central bankers do not solve 
this principal-agent-problem (McCallum 1997, Wood 1997). Government and central 
bankers might be prone to renege commonly. This problem of contracts becomes even 
more difficult to tackle in a monetary union such as EMU. The principal-agent-relation 
is not easy to sort out, the information being distributed even more asymmetrically 
between government and common central bank on the one hand and the European 
public on the other. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that the EMU member 
governments agree on a cartel-like behaviour opposing the general preference for low 
inflation. If the ECB had a contract with the European Council instead of granted 
independence, in domestic discussions each government would be able to use the 
argument that it was forced to less stability by a majority of members.17 The political 
costs of inflation would be low with a contract between the European Council and the 
ECB’s board of governors.  
Therefore, it is necessary to find an arrangement of strong monetary policy rules that 
avoids governmental arbitrariness in monetary policy. Central bank independence with 
                                                          
15 For methodical reasons, we analyse de jure commitment. De facto commitment is difficult to 
separate from credibility as it includes all attempts to cheat the public. Indeed, it seems even 
misspelled to name it commitment.  
16 At least this is the relevant principal-agent problem, as both problems are existing paralelly.  
17 This is a ‚perverse’ application of the dirty work hypothesis, put forward by Vaubel (1991).  
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a clearly defined policy objective, namely price stability, with clear rules about the 
board members and prohibition of central bank lending to the government, as laid down 
in the Maastricht Treaty seems to be the adequate answer to the principal-agent-
problem. This problem is best solved by setting up a central bank, which is granted 
instrument, but not goal independence (Debelle and Fischer 1995). In such a setting, the 
independent central bankers cannot impose their preferences on society if they stick to 
price stability in a recession and reject demands for additional money supply to 
stimulate the economy, as it is sometimes argued (e.g. Fischer 1995, p. 202). This 
argument is indeed misleading as the “constitutional decision” can only be reversed by 
another one. In particular, it is not the task of the central bankers to reinterpret their 
policy objective upon political demand. Independent central bankers only impose 
society’s preferences on society.18 
There is, however, one shortcoming in the usual interpretation of CBI. Central bank 
independence as interpreted in politics and defined in the literature19 is restricted to 
domestic monetary policy issues such as lending restrictions, policy formulation and 
relations between government and central bank. The relatively low correlation of de jure 
CBI and inflation (Berger et al. 2001) has lead to an increasing critical attitude towards 
the benefits of CBI. Hayo and Hefeker (2002) claim that CBI is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for price stability. They argue that there are alternatives to CBI, 
e.g. the already discussed contracts or exchange rate based stabilisation. The latter 
arrangement is also a monetary commitment, directed at external aspects and neglecting 
internal components of the regime. A foreign currency is used as a nominal anchor to 
achieve price stability. However, the criticism of low correlation between commitment 
and inflation also holds for exchange rate policy; it is even more difficult to identify a 
significant correlation between price stability and exchange rate fixing as alternative to 
CBI (Kuttner and Posen 2001, Freytag 2002b).  
                                                          
18 This would be different, if only the preferences of potential central bankers were considered in the 
appointment process, e.g. if conservative or dry central bankers were appointed (Rogoff 1985, 
Vickers 1986). It may make sense to appoint conservative central bankers as a complement to 
monetary commitment, but not as alternative. Therefore, this option is not discussed in this section.  
19 See e.g. Cukierman (1992), Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), Wagner (1998), Berger et al. (2001) for 
an introduction and overview.  
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We, therefore, argue that monetary commitment is not restricted to either internal or 
external aspects of monetary policy. It is a rather comprehensive concept consisting of 
internal and external components, which both are important for monetary stability. This 
can be easily seen with respect to the exchange rate regime, which affects price stability 
to a great deal. Interpreting external elements of the monetary regime – such as the 
exchange rate regime, convertibility, the opportunity to conduct business in forex etc. – 
as constitutive part of the monetary regime, is sensible as it reflects the government’s 
determination to pursue their monetary (and other macroeconomic) policy in a 
competitive international environment. This requirement seems to be particularly 
important in a dynamic setting: only a comprehensive and consistent policy assignment 
will allow a newly installed independent central bank in transition countries to become 
credible (Wagner 1998). Summarising, only a comprehensive view on monetary 
commitment allows identifying the government’s sincerity to guarantee stability of the 
currency (Freytag 2001). With a view on an enlarged EMU, this sincerity is truly 
important.  
To be sure that all EMU members use the same institutional setting, the Maastricht 
Treaty prescribes a high degree of CBI for the national central banks of all member 
countries. In the meantime, CBI has been granted to almost all accession candidates 
from CEE. Nevertheless, granting legal independence and introducing the correct 
incentives for governments and central banks takes time. Therefore, one cannot expect 
that monetary commitment in transition will be fixed once and never changed. Indeed, a 
number of countries have reshaped their central bank legislation at least twice after 
1989, e.g. Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania. If one adds exchange rate policy to this 
picture, institutional changes even took place more frequently. So there seems to be a 
convergence process with respect to the monetary regime in CEE, the result of which 
can be seen in Table 3. In the remainder of this section we introduce different measures 
of CBI and monetary commitment, which have been used to assess the degree of CBI in 
the CEE countries (see section IV).  
Legal CBI is generally measured by assessing the central bank law with respect to the 
ability of the central bankers to pursue a stability oriented monetary policy free of 
political influence. Thus certain criteria are introduced and given numerical values, 
which will be either added up (GMT-method) or averaged weighted or unweighted 
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(Cukierman-method). The measures of CBI in general have similar components, which 
can be distinguished into five groups. Not all measures consider all aspects mentioned 
in the following. In Table 2, some of the indicators, namely those recently used to 
calculate CBI in CEE countries, are presented and compared with respect to these five 
groups. 
First, independence of central banks is related to their CEOs, in particular their 
expertise, appointment and dismissal rules as well as number and length of terms. It is 
also of interest who appoints the CEO and board members and whether or not board 
members are allowed to hold other offices. Finally, one criterion is whether or not 
government members are on the board. A second group is related to policy formulation. 
In particular the question of whether or not the government is permitted to exert 
influence on monetary policy is of importance. It is analysed who sets discount rates, 
who sets the budget, who is responsible for banking regulation and supervision and how 
the central bank is accountable. Third, policy objectives are important. Central bank 
independence is sensible, if it is restricted to the monetary policy instruments, given a 
(politically set) policy objective. Independence is assumed to be high, if price stability is 
the only or at least the primary objective of the central bank.  
The most relevant aspect of CBI is the ability of the government to borrow from the 
central bank, as inflation in history has been a by-product of central bank lending to the 
government. If the bank is obliged to lend money to the government, independence can 
be regarded as being low. Different components can be distinguished, as the detailed 
categorising by Cukierman et al. (2002) shows. An important distinction is between 
direct lending and the bank’s participation in the primary market. It makes a difference, 
whether central banks are obliged to give direct loans or permitted to buy government 
bonds on the market. Finally, external monetary relations play a major role. These 
include the exchange rate arrangement and capital controls, as the latter indicate if and 
to what extent the government grants its citizens a free choice of how to spend their 
money.  
The index constructed by Grilli et al. (GMT, 1991) and further developed by 
Maliszewski (2000) is distinguished into political and economic independence. The 
measure is based on a set of questions (see Table 2 without the distinction into 
  13 
economic and political independence), which are answered by yes and no (0 or 1 
respectively). The higher, the score, the higher is CBI. No weighting takes place. The 
alternative method has been developed by Cukierman (1992). It is applied by 
Cukierman et al. (2002), Dvorsky (2000) and Freytag (2001). CBI (monetary 
commitment) is measured by 16 (Cukierman) and 13 (Freytag) components, which are 
normed between 0 and 1 with equidistant codings (see Cukierman 1992, pp. 373-376 
and Annex 2 of this paper).20 The weighted average (index LVAW in Cukierman 1992) 
is calculated, resulting in an index between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the higher is 
CBI. The advantage of the latter method is that the outcome is more differentiated than 
with the GMT method. The main difference between the Cukierman index and the 
Freytag index is the different importance assigned to limitations to lending on the one 
hand (Cukierman over 50 per cent, Freytag 20 per cent) and external aspects on the 
other hand (Cukierman 0 per cent, Freytag 30 per cent). Apart from these differences, 
one also finds significant differences in the interpretation of central bank laws, as Table 
3, columns 2 and 3, show. Although Dvorsky (2000) and Cukierman et al (2002) use 
exactly the same index, their CBI values differ a lot. Even the ranking is not equal.  
                                                          
20 For an economic justification of the used criteria see Freytag (2001).  
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Table 2: Measures of monetary commitment: methods and components  
 GMT (Maliszewski 2000) 
(CBI) 
Cukierman et al. 
(2002) (CBI) 
Freytag (2001) 
(monetary 
commitment) 
Method adding up (0-16) average (0-1) average (0-1) 
Groups    
 - CEO - term length 
- who appoints CEO? 
- dismissal 
- who appoints board members? 
- governmental board member? 
 
31.25 per cent 
- term lengths 
- who appoints? 
- dismissal 
- other offices 
 
 
20 per cent 
- expertise 
- dismissal 
 
 
 
 
10 per cent 
- policy 
formulation 
- governmental  
   approval 
- responsibility for policy 
- dispute settlement 
- discount rate 
- accountability 
- bank regulation 
 
37.5 per cent 
- who formulates? 
- final authority 
- CB budget 
 
 
 
 
 
15 per cent 
- final authority 
- accountability 
- bank regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
20 per cent 
- policy objective n.a. - objective 
 
 
15 per cent 
- objective 
- constitutional level 
 
20 per cent 
- lending 
restrictions 
- direct credit  
   facility (4 components) 
- primary market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31.25 per cent 
- advances 
- securitised lending 
- who decides? 
- circle of borrowers 
- types of limit 
- maturity of loans 
- interest rates 
- primary market 
 
50 per cent 
- direct loans  
- primary market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 per cent 
- external 
aspects 
n.a. n.a. - ER regime 
- convertibility 
- multiple ER? 
- currency competition 
 
30 per cent 
The percentages show the weights given to the group.  
Sources: Cukierman (1992), Maliszewski (2000), Dvorsky (2000) Freytag (2001). See 
also Annex 1. 
 
Besides legal commitment, i.e. de jure CBI, sometimes measures for actual 
commitment, i.e. de facto CBI, in particular turnover rates of CEOs are calculated. The 
reason for this procedure is that the expected negative correlation between legal CBI 
and inflation cannot be confirmed in empirical estimations for developing and transition 
countries (Berger et al. 2001, Freytag 2002a, pp. 42f). Turnover rates significantly 
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correlate with inflation in high inflation countries (Dvorsky 2000, pp. 26f). However, 
this result does not prove the superiority of indicators of actual CBI, as both high 
inflation and fast CEO turnover may well be caused by a common determinant, e.g. the 
inability of the government to solve the policy assignment problem. Moreover, it is not 
adequate for the assessment of institutional convergence, which is the convergence of 
formal and informal rules rather than of current behaviour. Thus, the calculation of 
turnover rates is not conducted in this paper.  
Finally, measures of CBI are not meant to serve the function of a norm for economic 
policy. Rather, the indices are designed to cover the whole possible range of central 
bank independence, i.e. as positive analytical tools. This implies that the highest score 
reflects the highest possible degree of independence. So far, no central bank has ever 
obtained the full score of e.g. the Cukierman index. Nevertheless, there can be a second 
function of an index, if it has been established well and is constructed with clearly 
defined and easily understandable criteria, with indeed set the frame for possible policy 
outcomes. In this sense, it can be seen as a benchmark. The question then would be: 
does the central bank law of a country meet the maximum requirements defined by the 
index of CBI or not?21  
 
IV. CBI in CEE: Empirical Evidence 
 
This section is dedicated to the calculation and discussion of CBI in accession 
candidates in Central and Eastern Europe. For a comparison, we add the figures for 
Bosnia Herzegovina and the ECB. The latter serves the function of a benchmark, 
indicating to what extent the accession candidates have already adopted the Maastricht 
Treaty. As for Bosnia, it currently seems to have the most independent central bank in 
Europe. We compare calculations based on the three approaches introduced above. 
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 3 display the calculations of these indices. Columns 5 
and 6, are different, they exclusively calculate internal criteria and external aspects of 
monetary commitment respectively (see Annex 2 for weights). These figures are 
                                                          
21 See Dvorsky (2000, p. 23) for an interpretation of the Cukierman index along these lines, when she 
argues that the Maastricht Treaty has less strict requirements than the Cukierman index.  
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presented to show the significant differences in CBI with and without the consideration 
of external components of monetary commitment.  
Obviously, all calculations presented here are directed to individual national central 
bank laws enacted at a certain point in time. Thus a convergence path is difficult to see. 
However, as Cukierman et al. (2002, p. 242) show, CBI in transition countries has 
increased in those countries enacting two central bank laws in the 1990s to a great 
extent. Some of the figures in Table 3 also refer to elder central bank laws (see below). 
The difference between two laws can implicitly be seen, when comparing the figures for 
Bulgaria and Romania before the reform in the elder publications by Maliszewski 
(2000) and Cukierman et al. (2002) with our calculations (taking into account the 
reforms in new central laws in these countries).22 In addition, it is self-evident that the 
countries in question have experienced a convergence process, as none of these had a 
functioning central bank before the transition period. Many countries such as Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania made severe mistakes in monetary policy at the 
beginning of transition, suffered from huge inflation rates and finally reversed their 
policies (see e.g. Freytag 2002a, pp. 103-112).Therefore, we use the evidence provided 
by the measures of CBI to assess the current state of convergence with respect to the 
future monetary policy in Euroland. We do not make assessments of the path so far.  
Nevertheless, several conclusions can be drawn from Table 3 with respect to the state of 
institutional convergence. To start with a general statement, the accession candidates 
have made their central banks independent according to the Maastricht Treaty. 
Institutional convergence in a formal sense has been reached, which can also be seen by 
comparing the results with the degree of CBI in Euroland. Bosnia and Estonia have 
even made their central banks more independent than the ECB is. To summarise: the 
2004-accession candidates, but also Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Romania, have adopted the 
appropriate central bank legislation. This general result holds independent of some 
significant differences between the countries, which can be seen when analysing the 
details.  
                                                          
22 The year of current central bank legislation is given in brackets behind the country in Table 3.  
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Table 3: CBI in CEE 
 Malis-
zewski 
(GMT) 
Dvorsky 
(LVAW) 
Cukierman 
et al. 
(LVAW) 
Freytag2 Freytag 
internal2 
Freytag 
external2 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bosnia (2000) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.92 0.94 0.92 
Bulgaria (1999) 15 n.a. 0.551 0.82 0.87 0.58 
Czech Republic 
(1991) 
13 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.84 0.73 
Estonia (1992) 13 n.a. 0.78 0.91 0.94 0.83 
Hungary (1991) 10 0.78 0.67 0.71 0.65 0.89 
Latvia (1992) 12 n.a. 0.49 0.77 0.76 0.81 
Lithuania (1996) 15 n.a. 0.78 0.74 0.67 0.83 
Poland (1997) 14 0.91 0.89 0.61 0.76 0.48 
Romania (1998) 71 n.a. 0.34 0.61 0.59 0.54 
Slovakia (1992) 11 0.68 0.62 0.54 0.53 0.48 
Slovenia (1991) 11 0.60 0.63 0.48 0.48 0.48 
ECB (1991) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.87 0.87 0.73 
1: based on central bank law of 1991; 2: for weights see Annex 2.  
Sources: Maliszewski (2000, p. 757), Dvorsky (2000, p. 10), Cukierman et al. (2002, p. 
242), own calculations based on IWP (2003) and Freytag (2001). See also Annex 1. 
 
In addition, the overall picture is similar regardless of the measures applied. With 
respect to a ranking, the currency boards in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania 
have the highest degree of CBI (with the exception of Poland in column 3 and Latvia in 
column 4). This common high ranking is due to the fact that the externalisation of the 
money creating process in a currency board arrangement is providing severe constraints 
for the governments (e.g. Baliño et al. 1997 and Bennett 1993). This holds concerning 
both limitations to lending (Cukierman et al. 2002, p. 257 and Annex 2 of this paper) 
and external obligations. The importance of both requirements is documented in 
columns 4 to 6, as the difference between internal and external commitment (and 
consequently to overall CBI in column 4) is rather low, implying that both restrictions 
are working. Nevertheless, in this group only Bosnia and Estonia receive the maximum 
score with respect to limitations to lending. Lithuania and Bulgaria both allow their 
central bank to buy and sell government assets on the primary market.23 In addition, 
there is another common property of all measures: Slovakia and Slovenia are at the 
                                                          
23 In Bulgaria, this reflects the fact that the currency board is not an orthodox one (Nenowsky and 
Hristow 2002).  
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lower end of the ranking, displaying the lowest degree of CBI of all CEE countries.24 
These countries do not impose severe restrictions with respect to the central bank’s 
lending facilities to the government; the central bank is not strictly prohibited to lend 
money to the government. These results are encouraging in that the show that different 
approaches with both different methods and weighting due to economic reasoning 
produce generally similar results. 
However, there are also striking differences.25 The Cukierman index (column 3) assigns 
the major Central European countries, namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (as 
well as Slovakia and Slovenia) a higher degree of CBI than our own calculations 
(column 4), at least in comparison with the Baltics. Moreover, the difference between 
the laggards Slovakia and Slovenia is much lower in column 3 than in our calculations. 
One reason for these differences lies in components with respect to the CEO and the 
board. Whereas Freytag (2001) focuses on the CEO’s expertise, Cukierman et al. (2002) 
put emphasis on the term length, other offices and the question of who appoints board 
members. The high scores in this area where the countries have put much stress on in 
their central bank laws, cause the Cukierman index to be higher.26  
Similarly, the higher weight (50 per cent) given to limitations on lending by Cukierman 
et al. (2002) raises the overall figures, as long as the limitations to lending are 
reasonably strict. This is the case in the major countries, although the currency boards 
naturally follow much stricter rules. An extreme case is Poland, which has enacted a 
special law, prohibiting public budget finance through the Polish National Bank.27 This 
setting is unique and has lead to a full score for half of the index (only 20 per cent of the 
index in our calculations). The differences in weighting individual components are 
visualised in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3. However, columns 5 and 6 (internal and 
external aspects of our index of commitment) reveal that the deviation of the two 
measures mainly are due to one major difference in the construction of the index, 
namely that the Cukierman index does not include international monetary relations,  
                                                          
24 The results for Romania in column 1 and Bulgaria in column 3 reflect outdated central bank 
legislation. 
25 We restrict the following paragraphs to columns 3 and 4.  
26 This may indeed partly reflect some influence on legislators by the Cukierman index. See section 
III, last paragraph. 
27 Poland had extreme difficulties to finance the public budget until the late 1990s. 
  19 
whereas our calculation does. If one considers only internal aspects of our index, the 
deviations are rather small (columns 3, 4 and 5). The interpretation of the central bank 
legislation in accession countries is similar. This changes slightly when external aspects 
are taken into account.  
In the remainder of the section, we discuss the general role of external aspects by 
comparing the external components of the index of commitment of the accession 
candidates with the EMU members. The mainly positive assessment of CBI in accession 
countries is slightly qualified by this exercise. One has to look at single members, as 
external aspects are not harmonised in Euroland. Thereby, we want to analyse whether 
the striking progress CEE countries have made concerning CBI, still is prevalent once 
external aspects are also included. We start with a short discussion of the components 
chosen (see Annex 1). The component extern shows the exchange rate regime. A higher 
score implies higher commitment, which reflects the function of fixed exchange rates as 
nominal anchor in transition countries. However, it has to be emphasised that this 
component is most important for countries with a long tradition of inflation, not so 
much for industrialised countries with a stability record, such as Euroland or the US. 
Therefore, and as it is impossible to decide the question of whether or not an exchange 
fix is better or worse for achieving price stability than flexible exchange rates without a 
closer look at the respective economy (Freytag 2002b)28, the weight of the exchange 
rate regime in column 6 is low (10 per cent). The main component is conv, reflecting 
convertibility restrictions (50 per cent in column 6). The third component is comp, 
showing if and to what extent governments allow their citizens to use foreign 
currencies. A high grade signals that the government is considering stability as 
desirable, even at the expense of a seigniorage loss, if foreign currency replaces the 
domestic currency. All accession (and EMU member) countries with the exception of 
Hungary and Bosnia allow their citizens to hold foreign currency in cash and on 
accounts. Only the two exceptions allow that foreign currencies are also used as means 
of payments. Finally, mult is indicating whether or not multiple exchange rates are used. 
None of the countries in question today applies multiple exchange rates.29 
                                                          
28 See also the general discussion of this issue in Buiter and Grafe (2002).  
29 Again, this component is added to the index to cover a wider range of monetary regimes, today it 
seems to be unnecessary to look for multiple exchange rates in Europe.  
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Comparing columns 4, 5 and 6 in Table 3, reveals that in countries that run a currency 
board the differences between the outcomes are the smallest. A currency board requires 
a nominal anchor (plus 100 per cent coverage of the monetary basis by forex) and full 
convertibility to be workable. The only exception is Bulgaria, which runs a heterodox 
currency board with some flexibility for monetary policy left (Nenowsky and Hristow 
2002). Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have set up convertibility restrictions. 
In particular in case of Poland the deviation from internal components is huge and 
explains why Dvorsky (2000) as well as Cukierman et al. (2002) assign a much higher 
degree of CBI to the country than our calculations do. In addition, these countries have 
a flexible exchange rate regime, which at least can be interpreted as the perceived need 
for more flexibility (discretion) than under fixed exchange rates. The inclusion of 
external aspects indeed shows that there are differences with respect to convertibility, 
which may be overlooked by a concentration on domestic aspects of CBI. The 
convertibility restrictions are further analysed in comparison with EMU member 
countries.  
The coding chosen for this component does not consider and differentiate all possible 
restrictions one can think of. Thus, we also will refer to IMF categories (IMF 2002).30 
In Table 4 we use this categorising to compare convertibility restrictions of selected 
current and potential EMU member countries. We do not consider those countries that 
do not or at least almost do not restrict convertibility. These countries are among the 
current EMU members Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Among the accession candidates Bosnia Herzegovina 
and Hungary grant full convertibility. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia as well as 
Lithuania are also assigned the full score, although there are some minor restrictions. To 
demonstrate the difference between full and less convertibility, Estonia as the marginal 
case is included in Table 4.  
                                                          
30 The index of commitment is constructed more generally to generate data for as many countries as 
possible within a huge time span. However, it is based on the IMF (2002) data.  
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Table 4: Convertibility restrictions in selected current members and 
accession countries 
 A F P Esp Bu Ee Pol Ro SR Slo 
Controls on payments 
for transfers and 
invisibles 
    *  * * *  
Controls on export 
proceeds 
    *  * * *  
Controls on capital 
transactions 
          
- market securities  * *  *  * * * * 
- money market 
instruments 
 * *  *  * * * * 
- collective instru-
ments securities 
 *   *  * * * * 
- derivatives    * *  * * * * 
- commercial credits    *   * *   
- financial credits     *  * *   
- guarantees     *  * *   
- fdi * * * * * * *  * * 
- liquidations of fdi    *       
- real estate 
transactions 
*   * * * * * * * 
- personal capital 
transactions 
    * * * *   
Provisions on capital 
transactions 
          
- commercial banks *  * * * * * * * * 
- institutional 
investors 
* * * *  * *   * 
A = Austria, F = France, P = Portugal, Esp = Spain, Bu = Bulgaria, Ee = Estonia, Pol = 
Poland, Ro = Romania, SR = Slovakia, Slo = Slovenia.  
Source: IMF (2002). 
 
There are a number of convertibility restrictions shown in the table. Almost all 
accession countries as well as the EMU members in Table 4 restrict foreign direct 
investment (fdi) and real estate purchases by foreigners. Some countries restrict 
portfolio investments, and some even control payments related to the current account 
(Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). This is not the case in Euroland. The 
evidence presented in Table 4 clearly shows that the accession countries with the lowest 
degree of convertibility do not match the EMU average, even if we consider that some 
member countries such as France, Portugal and Spain still restrict convertibility to a 
certain extent. This assessment remains valid, even if one takes into account that the 
restrictions documented by an asterisk often imply weaker controls such as 
requirements for authorisation. Still the fact remains that one major accession candidate, 
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namely Poland, has set up a number of restrictions and approval requirements, followed 
by Slovakia and Slovenia. The two countries waiting to be next to join the EU also deny 
full convertibility so far.  
This evidence can be interpreted as follows: some of the accession candidates still have 
to change their monetary regime in order to fully qualify for EMU in a substantial and 
material sense. Even if the formal requirements of the Maastricht Treaty are met, part of 
the policy assignment is not appropriate to foster real and nominal convergence. The 
most striking example is Poland, where on the one hand limitations to lending are 
perfectly incorporated into the legal structure; on the other hand convertibility is 
restricted rather heavily. It has to be mentioned that Table 4 covers less than half of the 
CEE accession countries. At the same time, the majority of them already have 
introduced full current account and capital account convertibility. 
Statistical relation between CPI and CBI 
 
V. Conclusions: CEE Close to Institutional Convergence  
 
The paper shows that the accession candidates from Central and Eastern Europe have 
made significant progress in their ambitions to qualify for EMU accession in recent 
years. This holds very much with respect to nominal convergence, in particular if one 
recalls the considerable stability problems most of these countries had less than a 
decade ago. The most demanding problem in these countries was inflation, e.g. in the 
Baltic countries inflation rates hit 1,000 per cent in the early 1990s and were at least on 
a two-digit level until the 1990s. Inflation rates in CEE since have been (sustainably) 
reduced to one-digit figures. The fiscal criteria probably will be met by almost all 
countries; only recently the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland considerably missed 
the deficit criterion (Table 1). With respect to real convergence, especially the catching 
up in per capita GDP, progress is smaller. This is unsurprising; given the low level the 
countries had reached in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, some countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia are above 50 per cent of EU average. Others 
still have some way to go to reach this level.  
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Both nominal and real convergence of the CEE accession candidates are under close 
scrutiny. The Maastricht Treaty seems to be strict regarding EMU entry – only after the 
Council has decided that a country has met the nominal criteria, it will join EMU. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the decision, which country will join and which 
will remain a pre-in will not only be driven by the formal criteria. Imagine that at the 
end of 2006 only one or two smaller countries meet the nominal convergence criteria, 
whereas bigger ones (slightly) miss them. Experience with the nominal convergence of 
the founding members in 1998 suggests that under political pressure the decision about 
EMU membership will be biased towards more countries joining the Union than meet 
the criteria.  
In addition, the Balassa-Samuelson effect plus a likely real appreciation of new EU 
members due to previously unexperienced capital inflows and transfers from structural 
funds may give perverse incentives for governments to restrict economic growth hoping 
that this leads to lower inflation. Such a weighing-in behaviour will cause economic 
costs, which should be avoided. Again, there may be political pressure to ease EMU 
accession.  
Therefore, we advocate considering a third type of convergence, namely institutional 
convergence. The Maastricht Treaty has also set clear rules for central bank 
independence. The economic reason for the importance of institutional convergence is 
that it helps to foster the other two types of convergence. It also gives evidence about 
the governments’ ability to organise a stability oriented economic policymaking 
process. This will be important, if the decision about EMU accession is made 
independent of the criteria. If institutional convergence is high, such a deviation does 
not necessarily imply the danger of growing instability in Euroland, as the countries 
attitude towards policy making is similar.  
There is widespread agreement in the literature that CBI in Central and Eastern Europe 
is high. The results cited in this paper as well as those calculated here, support this view 
(Table 3). Apart from two accession candidates, were the relations between government 
and central bank with respect to central bank loans to the government are not well-
defined, all candidates plus Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Romania have made 
their central banks independent. However, there is one caveat, namely that the external 
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monetary relations are not covered by most measures of CBI. We add components that 
consider these relations with a focus on convertibility restrictions and the role of foreign 
currencies in the country (Table 2) and calculate an index of monetary commitment. 
The degree of monetary commitment in three accession countries and Bulgaria and 
Romania slightly changes, when convertibility restrictions (Table 4) are considered. The 
conclusion of this evidence is straightforward: besides nominal (and real) convergence, 
economic policy should also be directed at institutional convergence, in particular at a 
dismantling of convertibility restrictions prior to EMU accession.  
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Annex 1: Index of monetary commitment 
Criterion Com-
ponent 
Explanation  Numerical 
codings 
Stated objectives of  obj 1. Price stability only goal 1.00 
monetary policy  2. Other objectives mentioned  0.66 
  3. Other objectives equally 
     important  
0.33 
  4. No goals for monetary policy 0.00 
    
Locus of legal  const 1. Constitution 1.00 
commitment  2. Central bank law 0.66 
  3. Decree 0.33 
  4. Not fixed at all 0.00 
    
Discretionary power  gov 1. No power left to the government 1.00 
belonging to the 
government 
 2. Exchange rate only issue to be  
     consulted between government 
 
        and monetary authority 0.66 
  3. Exchange rate regime completely  
      left to government 0.33 
  4. Government may override central 
     bank as regards monetary policy 
0.00 
    
Conditions of appoint-  ceo 1. CEO must be a reputed expert 1.00 
ment and dismissal of   2. No expertise demanded 0.00 
monetary CEO    
 diss 1. Appointment with fixed term and   
      dismissal only after criminal  
     offenses and bad performance 
1.00 
  2. No rules for dismissal 0.50 
  3. Dismissal unconditioned or linked 
     to resignation of governments  
     and ministers 
0.00 
    
Conditions of lending  limcred 1. No central bank credit allowed  1.00 
to the government  2. Central bank credit allowed  
     conditionally 
0.50 
  3. Central bank credit allowed  
     unconditionally 
0.00 
    
 limprim 1. Central bank is not allowed to  
      purchase public bonds on the  
       primary market 1.00 
  2. Central bank is allowed to  
      purchase public bonds in hard   
      currency on the primary market 0.66 
  3. Central bank is allowed to  
       purchase public bonds in any cur-  
       rency on the primary market 0.33 
  4. No limitations on credit activities 0.00 
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Annex 1 (cont.: 
Supervision and  reg 1. Supervision and regulation is   
regulation of the       assigned to a separated body 1.00 
financial system by the  2. Supervision and regulation is   
central bank      assigned to central bank 0.50 
  3. No supervision and regulation 0.00 
    
Accountability of the  acc 1. Obligation to inform the public 1.00 
central bank  2. Obligation to inform the   
      parliament in public hearings 0.66 
  3 Obligation to inform the  
      government without publicity 0.33 
  4. No accountability 0.00 
    
External pledges of  extern 1. Exchange rate fixed to a hard  
the government      currency and money base fully  
      backed with foreign reserves 1.00 
  2. Exchange rate fixed 0.75 
  3. Crawling peg 0.50 
  4. Managed floating 0.25 
  5. Free floating 0.00 
    
Convertibility  conv 1. Full convertibility 1.00 
restrictions  2. Partial convertibility 0.75 
  3. Convertibility for current  
      account transactions only 0.50 
  4. Convertibility for capital  
      account transactions only 0.25 
  5. No convertibility 0.00 
    
 mult 1. One exchange rate 1.00 
  2. Multiple exchange rate 0.00 
    
Interactions with  comp 1. A hard currency can be used   
other currencies      for all transactions 1.00 
  2. A hard currency can be used   
      for some transactions, others 
    excluded 
0.66 
  3. A hard currency may be held 0.33 
  4. No holdings or transactions in   
      hard currencies allowed 0.00 
 
Source: Freytag (2001, p. 198-199), own changes. 
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Annex 2: CBI in CEECS: components (Freytag) in detail 
 obj con gov ceo diss lim1 lim2 reg acc ext conv com mul Index 
 Internal 
aspects 
        external 
aspects 
    
Bosnia 1.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.9240 
Bulgaria 1.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.50 1.00 1.00 0,50 0.33 1.00 0.8235 
Czech 
Republic 
0.66 0.66 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.7395 
Estonia 1.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.9075 
Hungary 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.7055 
Latvia 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.7655 
Lithuania 0.66 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.7395 
Poland 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.6065 
Romania 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.6075 
Slovakia 0.66 0.66 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.5395 
Slovenia 0.66 0.66 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.66 0.00 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.4815 
ECB 0.66 1.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.8655 
Weights 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 1 
Weigths  
- internal 
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.05 0.05     1 
Weights  
- external 
         0.1 0.5 0.15 0.25 1 
Source: IMF (2002), IWP (2003), components based on Annex 1. 
 
